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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW 
AND POLITICS 
DR. MIRO CERAR* 
ABSTRACT: This article examines some basic characteristics of the 
relationship between national and international law and politics. The law 
functions in relation to politics in three basic aspects, namely as a goal, a 
means, or an obstacle. First, politics can define certain predominantly 
legal values or institutions as its goal. In this case the political 
understanding of these values or institutions becomes almost identical to 
an authentic legal understanding of the same values or institutions. 
Second, politics can comprehend the law merely as a means for the 
fulfillment of certain political interests. In this case politics is neutral in 
its attitude toward the law. Finally, politics can interpret law as an 
obstacle on the way toward the realization of certain political goals. In 
this situation either politics prevails over law, or vice versa. In the first 
case politics effectuates its solutions at the expense of the rule of law, 
while in the second case the autonomy of law is preserved through the 
decisions of the highest courts or by other actions taken by lawyers, 
intellectuals, associations, organizations, and the public in order to stop 
illicit acts of political actors. Law and politics create their own particular 
pictures of reality. Sometimes those pictures overlap, sometimes they 
differ. Yet, there is something that the law should never include in its 
sphere; namely, the differentiation of adversaries according to a purely 
political criterion. This leads to a strict separation between "ours" and 
"yours", or, in its most radical expression, to a strict separation between 
friend and enemy. When the latter occurs, politics inevitably prevails 
over the law, and reduces or damages the autonomy of the rule of law. 
* Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines some basic characteristics of the relationship 
between national and international law l and politics. The subject is 
obviousiy much iuu cumpiex io be deait wiih in aii possibie aspects here; 
however, some fundamental issues of theoretical and practical, 
importance are presented with special emphasis. For example, there is 
an argument to be made that certain checks and balances between law 
and politics are critical for the relatively peaceful and value-positive 
(constructive) development of mankind and democratically organized 
societies. The relatively high level of the autonomy of modern law2 is 
one of the most significant factors that define the limits of politics and 
thus contributes to the constructive development of different societies. 
II. STARTING POINT PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN POLITICS AND LAW 
Law and politics as social phenomena are two emanations of the same 
entity (a monistic ontological conception), regarding which their separate 
existence is only a consequence of a human dualistic or pluralistic 
perception of the world (a dualistic ontological conception). 
Furthermore, the difference between law and politics is, from a deeper 
ontological perspective, in fact only illusory, for reason of which also in 
the fields of legal and political theory and philosophy there are 
conclusions regarding the partial or complete overlapping of law and 
politics, sometimes even the equating of the two that raises a crucial 
question of how both notions are defined. Regardless of such findings, 
the distinction (i.e. consciously persisting in a distinction) between law 
and politics at the current level of human development is necessary and 
indispensable. 
With politics, it is necessary to distinguish three fundamental 
dimensions: the institutional dimension, the normative dimension, and 
the process-related dimension. The institutional dimension is expressed 
by the term polity and entails the operation of various regulated state and 
non-state institutions like political parties, social movements, public 
I. In this article, by the tenn international law I refer exclusively to public internationallaw. 
2. A legal system must have a relative degree of autonomy. It cannot be but 'power politics' 
nor can it be only a specialized language to describe behavior. It lacks the character of law if it is not 
in some degree 'binding', that is, it must be a means of independent control that affectively limits the 
acts of the entities subject to it. To that degree, law must be independent of politics. Nor is it law if 
decisions are wholly arbitrary or capricious. But acknowledging the necessity of that degree of 
autonomy still allows us to recognize that non-legal factors partly detennine or influence the 
creation, application and modification of the norms and procedures that constitute the legal system 
(Schachter, 1986, p.747). 
2
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media, the legislature, and the government. The normative dimension is 
expressed by the term policy and entails the creation of normative ideas 
or ideals that define basic societal values and objectives geared towards a 
practical realization of such. Lastly, the process-related dimension is 
expressed by the term politics, which is expressed in the formation of the 
political will through the implementation of the social power and 
authority and built up through conflict and consensus.3 
If we attempt to concisely analyze the law through the above mentioned 
three dimensions, we can see that from an institutional perspective, the 
law is expressed primarily through two factors: the establishment of 
specific state bodies legitimized by means of their specific professional 
legal structure and functioning (e.g., the courts and the state prosecutor's 
office), and non-state institutions where the attorneyship belongs. From 
the normative perspective, the law is the creation of general and 
individual legal norms. From the process-related perspective, the law 
appears by means of various procedures like the legislative or criminal 
procedures where legal solutions are formed through the functioning of 
state bodies and individuals. 
In this text, I will discuss politics in its broadest meaning, primarily 
encompassing the process-related sense, which also includes various 
policies and polities. I will define law as the binding value-normative 
system established and carried out by, the state in national law and 
carried out by international organizations and institutions in international 
law, which are intended for the establishment and maintenance of a 
balance between justice and order and solving and preventing pressing 
societal and international conflicts. 
The relation between politics and law has both a progressive function 
and a safeguarding function. Law and politics, separately or together, 
both encourage and suppress the development of societal relations, while 
they both also function to bring about justice and order. The essence of 
their "separate and connected" but not integral existence is to help set 
each other's borders. These borders prevent excessive one-sidedness in 
politics or the law, similar to a "checks and balances" mechanism. In 
actuality, all legal institutes are a partial reflection of individual or 
collective political decisions at a certain time and in a certain 
environment, which have assumed a legal form and nature. This is true in 
systems where the main rule-framer is an extremely politically 
legitimized body (e.g. the parliament as legislature) and also in systems 
3. Drechsler, Hiligen, Neumann, 1995, p. 632. 
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where judicial-precedent law has a strong influence because even the 
most autonomous judiciary is always determined by some sort of 
political influence.4 Legal institutes, however, have a reverse influence 
on politics in that they limit and direct politics as part of a wider legal 
awareness, or specific legal ideology. 
In a mutual relationship, politics and law do not have constantly 
determined roles, since in different periods they can be, either in 
agreement or in opposition, socially progressive or conservative, or even 
reactionary. But, it must be stressed that for law an especially 
emphasized conservative functionS is characteristic and important, 
despite the fact that it can sometimes function in a developmentally 
progressive or creative manner. This doesn't suggest that law cannot be 
successful in promoting new societal relations but it does suggest that 
only from the aspect of legal policy, this should not be exaggerated. Most 
often, but not always, it is better to encourage those mechanisms through 
which the legal order reacts quickly and effectively to the emerging 
social circumstances and prevents the possibility of one-sidedness or 
exaggerated aspirations of politics. 
It is an immanent characteristic of every law that it is also the means of 
certain politics.6 However, law is never a pure form through which 
political content would be realized, since it is in the very nature of law to 
be relatively autonomous or independent.7 Politics cannot exist without 
4. Compare, for example, Dworkin, 1985, pp. 10-11. 
5. Since every legal act brings about a certain change in the existing (legal) system and 
therefore always has, in this respect, a dynamic, "developmental" (ideologically progressive or 
regressive) nature, I would like to explain that by the conservative function of law I mean above all 
the fact that ideas about the new legal order of various societal fields are primarily an expression of a 
changed political, moral, religious, economic, etc., thinking, and only to a smaller degree also of 
autonomous legal thinking. The law primarily "conserves" such novelties in its specific (e.g. 
legislative or judicial precedent) form, and it often also limits them according to the possibilities 
which are allowed by the existing (constitutional) legal system. Naturally, it is also possible to agree 
with the standpoints that the law is never only a reflection of the life in society, but it always 
significantly co-creates and changes the current of societal events (see, e.g. Bugaric 2000, p. 34). 
However, with regard to this, one must bear in mind that "political policies" are, at least to the 
degree to which we accept the relative autonomy of politics and law, much more "creative" than is 
true for "legal policies". Especially in the modem age, politics have assumed, in most cases, the 
form of general legal acts (e.g. statutes and regulations), which is why e.g. laws that implement 
various essential societal novelties or reforms, are, in terms of their content, generally still above all 
an expression of a (new) politics and political ideology, and only to a lesser degree an expression of 
autonomous legal policies and ideology - certainly, however, such examples very vividly point to 
the indeterminate nature of the border between law and politics. 
6. From the point of view of political thinking the legal system can be viewed as part of the 
political system, which means that the legislatures and courts are political institutions, the rule of 
law is a political ideal, and adjudication and legal reasoning are practices and techniques which are 
part of the political culture of the society in which they flourish (see Waldron (2004), pp. 352 ff.) 
7. Compare Maihofer 1969, pp. 1-18, who has defined the role of law in relation to (political) 
ideology in the light of two opposing fundamental functions. On one hand, he defines law as an 
4
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the law, since the law forms it and keeps it within certain limits that are 
dictated above all by the ideas of justice and social order. But, law could 
not exist without politics, since politics gives law its driving force and its 
"rough content" or substance, which law then adapts to its autonomous 
framework and develops its final form, expressing it in a specific 
normative manner. Thus, one of the most demanding tasks of every 
society is to continuously attempt to establish and maintain an 
appropriate balance between politics and law. This relationship is 
completely different in an authoritarian or totalitarian state as compared 
to a democratic state based on the rule of law. This is because in an 
authoritarian or totalitarian state, the "legal policy" is a subordinate to the 
"political policy." This is in contrast to a democratic state where there is 
a dynamic, partner-competitor relationship between the two policies 
where sometimes politics prevails and other times the law prevails. 
In democratic orders, modern law and politics, as a general rule, 
intensively confront one another in legislative and other parliamentary 
procedures. This is where the influence of politics on law is the 
strongest. Nevertheless, modern law maintains a great amount of 
autonomy. This autonomy is achieved through: the fact that interest 
groups never fully determine the decisions of a pluralistic legislative 
body or could direct such body exclusively according to political 
preferences; substantive and procedural legal rules, which to a large 
degree determine the limiting framework where the legislature operates 
and creates certain parliamentary practice (routine), which it is difficult 
to depart from (the predominance of legal formalism); and the 
independent judiciary that limits excessive political aspirations and 
places them within the legal limits of functioning.8 What is especially 
important today in many countries is the role of constitutional courts. 
These courts, as a general rule, routinely interfere with the politically 
conditioned and interwoven activities of the legislative and executive 
branches of power, and therefore their decisions are naturally more or 
less politically colored. Finally, a certain level of legal awareness can be 
added to all this. Legal awareness always develops in political actors 
and directs them as an internal commitment to observing fundamental 
legal values and the existing law. 
ideological factor ("ideologisches Faktum"), and on the other as a critical factor in opposition to 
ideology ("ideologiekritische Instanz"). 
8. Lempert, Sanders 1990, pp. 429-430. 
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III. FACTORS OF THE RELATNE AUTONOMY OF (MODERN) 
LAW 
The factors that ensure the relative autonomy of modern law can 
generaiiy be divided into two groups: the iargeiy rurrnai raduns of the 
autonomy of modern law are its specific formalism, abstract nature, 
generality, systematicity, specific finguistic expression (legal language), 
and the professionalization of its agents; in the material (substantive) 
sense the autonomy of law is ensured primarily by its own historically 
developed and consolidated values (legal tradition), which are 
distinguished as a relatively independent whole from the political, moral, 
customary, religious, and other values. 
If we briefly look at generality, abstractness, formalism, and 
systematicity, we can see that these four largely formal characteristics of 
modern law indicate a new quality as compared to pre-modern law. 
Generality is a characteristic of the legal norm in that it does not aim at 
an individually determined person, but rather at a category of people, 
who are determined only by general characteristics. Generality includes a 
legal "depersonalization" of the subject, which appears along with the 
neglect of his individual and societal peculiarities. The main function of 
generality is to ensure legal equality. 
The abstractness of legal norms refers to characteristics of norms that 
through means of symbols and concepts rise above concrete cases and 
create a model of action, i.e. a pre-formed standard of future 
relationships and action. The main function of abstractness is to ensure 
legal predictability and trust in the law. Generality and abstractness help 
establish typical legal norms. This is especially characteristic of a 
modern state based on the rule of law that rejects medieval legal 
particularism, legal inequality, and the arbitrariness of authority. 
Formalism is an inevitable consequence of generality and abstractness in 
law. It is that characteristic of the legal norm that makes it appear to us as 
a concept separated from concrete content, it establishes clearly formed 
demands in the process of the formation and use of the law. Legal 
formalism enables a technical-rational functioning of the state apparatus 
and other subjects, enabling parties to envisage legal consequences. 
Systematicity includes the tendency of the legal system to represent, to 
the greatest possible degree, a logically coherent, internally balanced, 
and non-paradoxical system of legal norms. The main characteristics and 
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functions of the legal system are manifested as ensuring the highest 
possible level of unity, coherence, and completeness of the law.9 
None of the four mentioned formal characteristics of modern law is an 
expression of ideologically neutral methods; instead they all represent an 
expression of a certain spiritually conditioned societal development. In 
the narrow sense, these characteristics are primarily an expression of the 
political demand of the modern society seeking to have such a legal form 
secured. This corresponds to the values of the modern society and to its 
accompanying economic and political structure. to The formal and 
material characteristics of modern law are thus mutually dependent; the 
former cannot be understood without the latter. 
An important factor, which in the development of modern society has 
made a significant contribution to the high degree of autonomy of the 
law, is the formation of a broad stratum of people engaged professionally 
in the law and other specific properties of the law (i.e. legal formalism, 
the "monopolistic" nature of legal language.). An old saying from the 
time of the reception of Roman law exemplifies the importance of the 
personal element: "What a lawyer cannot contemplate does not legally 
exist".l1 This thinking is related to the methodological approach, which 
seeks a definition of the law merely by focusing on the subject which 
legal experts are dealing with. But this or any other closed definition of 
the law may lead to it being comprehended in an entirely self-referential 
manner and hence a circulus VltlOSUS. An example of such 
comprehension is the autopoietic definition (or theory) of law, which 
defines the law as a self-regulatory system capable of self-generation. 12 
This view of the law asserts its independence of religious, economic, and 
other historical constellations because it acts exclusively in accordance 
with the rules that it sets itself.13 The autopoietic definition (or theory) of 
law should have a liberating effect for law, but it is instead a distorted 
rational comprehension of a certain phenomenon (in this case, the law) in 
which a high degree of analytical or discriminating capability of rational 
thought is maintained. But, this paralyzes its irrationally conditioned 
9. For more detail on the four basic characteristics of modem law, see Perenic 1981, pp. 29-
49; 75-85. 
10. Ibid. 
II. See Weber (note 32), pp. 492, 493. 
12. The main characteristics of an autopoietic system are: I. the system produces and 
reproduces itself in accordance with its own rules, where new elements emerge exclusively through 
manipulation of the elements within the system itself; 2. the existence and dynamics of the 
autopoietic system are dependent on maintaining its capacity for autopoiesis; 3. no external factors 
can cause a change in this system because all changes to the system are exclusively internal and 
structurally immanent (for more detail, see, for example, Sumic-Riha, Riha, 1993, pp. 48-57). 
13. See Teubner, 1989, p. 36 ff. 
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developmental Uumping) component, because reason cannot succeed in 
breaking out of the closed system. 
While an autopoietic comprehension of the law has a positive function, 
at least as it highlights the great importance of systemized positive law 
and as it intensifies the questionable nature of man's objective capacity to 
appeal to transcendental values and other extra-legal conditions of 
lawfulness, it merits repeating that the law cannot, by its very nature, be 
an entirely independent whole. This is because the mediating role is one 
of its basic functions. Grasping the autonomy of the law as a relative and 
limited category also reflects man's deep awareness of the all-
encompassing mutual connectivity of individual phenomena in the 
world. So the rational remodeling of this deep intuitive awareness, 
which links the law with extra-legal spheres, much more accurately 
reflects the authentic nature of the law than does the autopoietic or some 
similar rationalization of the legal phenomenon, such as Kelsen's "pure 
theory of law."14 
Returning now to lawyers and other subjects who contribute by their 
activities to the high level of autonomy of the modem legal system, we 
can see that these subjects belong to professional groups that establish a 
high degree of monopoly on the understanding and implementation of 
law. Lawyers and officials established this monopoly primarily from two 
perspectives: firstly, through their specific manner of organization and 
formalized (rigid) rules of operation; secondly, through the formation of 
a specific language of the law. Naturally, there is an essential difference 
between lawyers and officials. The position of lawyers and judges is 
much more independent. Accordingly, they can, to a relatively large 
degree, co-create the law. Meanwhile, public administration officials are 
much more hierarchically subordinated in their functioning and can 
within their competences only minimally co-create the law. 
Max Weber was amongst the first to more broadly point out the 
characteristics and peculiarities of the modem bureaucratic state 
apparatus. 15 Among these characteristics, there are many that lead to the 
monopolization of administrative activities by bureaucracy. These 
characteristics include the realization that administrative-legal 
regulations are extremely and specifically formalized, which lowers the 
14. See Kelsen, 1934. 
15. These characteristics are above all strict rationality, fonnalism, the hierarchical nature and 
connectedness of functioning, inner discipline, professionalization, the separation of the 
administrative apparatus from the means of administration, careerism, the business routine - i.e. an 
impersonal approach to dealing with matters (the operation of sine ira et studio), etc. For more detail 
on this, see Weber, 1956, pp. \25-130; cf. Tadic, 1988, pp. 272-284. 
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comprehensibility of the law for the layperson. Conversely, the Judiciary 
and other activities of professional lawyers also establish numerous 
interpretational and legal sub-systems by their immanent formalism. 
This, to a considerable degree, transforms the fundamental general 
messages of legal acts into "legal esoteric a" . It is thus justifiably possible 
to consider legal or judicial formalism, as one of the central constitutive 
elements of the autonomy of the law. 16 
Within the framework of legal formalism, special importance is placed 
on legal language. Legal language adds to the high level of autonomy of 
(modern) law. Naturally, legal language can never be completely 
autonomous since it is always a sub-system of the general language from 
which it takes the largest share of its formal and content-related 
characteristics. 17 However, certain broader layers of the legal language 
are distinctly legally specific. This means that other language systems 
aspiring to express themselves through law (e.g. politics, economics, 
morals) have to significantly adapt to these layers. This is a common 
practice used by the state or other political authorities whom are aware 
that a monopoly on the legal language is a powerful means of 
maintaining a monopoly on power.18 The difference between various 
historical ways and the modern way of monopolizing the legal language 
is that in the past (e.g., in the middle ages) authorities often denied the 
public nature of the law or they arbitrarily and unpredictably created the 
law. Conversely, in modem society, the public nature of the law is one 
of its fundamental principles. But nevertheless, due to its extreme 
extensiveness and complexity, the law remains to a large degree only in 
the cognitive reach of legal, administrative, and related occupations. 
Alongside all the above-mentioned and largely formal factors of the 
relative autonomy of modern law, we should at least briefly point out a 
key substantive, content-related aspect of this autonomy, the value-
related tradition of the law itself. The specific tradition of the law is a 
condition sine qua non of the autonomy of the law and its quality in 
terms of values. Even revolution that forcibly and radically eliminates 
some political and legal order at the same time always "assumes" some 
other political and legal history, for example, the bourgeois instead of 
feudal or the democratic instead of autocratic. Revolutions require the 
parties to establish a new order, while either following the tradition of 
16. See Lempert, Sanders. 1990, pp. 410-419. 
17. For more detail, see e.g. Viskovic, 1989, pp. 25-3J. 
18. Viskovic, ibid., p. 125, is even of the opinion that the language of the law is more 
exclusive and secretive than religious or political languages since it diverges from the general 
language and general national awareness on a deeper level than the other two. 
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some other existing order or by following the example of a tradition 
formed by the fundamental premises of its philosophical-legal and 
social-theoretical doctrine Clearly, revolution can never be so radical as 
to momentarily completely break all forms of continuity with the former 
legal order, practice, and thinking. A part of the "old history" is thus for 
at least some time still preserved in various legal customs and legal 
thinking. And as a rule a part of this history is preserved within a 
renovated institutional order. 
Lastly, the key for understanding the relative autonomy of the law is 
examining the issue of the relationship between law and power/force, 
since the effectiveness of the law always depends on some kind of 
normative, cognitive, or other power, and in the final consequence also 
on physical force (coercion). The principled question that arises first in 
connection with this is "whether force is merely a means of realizing the 
law," as is usually claimed by traditional legal theory, or is force actually 
the content of law itself? as some important legal theorists think (e.g., 
Karel Olivecrona, Hans Kelsen, Alf Ross.)19 It should at this point be 
briefly emphasized that the power of law is also expressed through force, 
which is immanent in legal norms, but this manifestation of power just 
by itself does not ensure also actually effective force. The law can also be 
defined as a system of rules about force, but law by itself, without 
"assistance from outside", cannot fully realize such force. Accordingly, 
the law needs politics and political power2° and in a broader sense 
morals, customs, etc, which are in agreement with the law as a whole. 
This in turn enables and ensures its effectiveness through its institutions 
specialized also for the implementation of physical force. 
IV. THE STATIC AND DYNAMIC NATURE OF MODERN LAW 
Goethe once said "all periods that regress and decay are subjective, while 
periods of progress have an objective orientation."21 While it is true that 
this oscillatory and dualistic perception of the world does generally 
accompany human development, this or any other bipolarity is, in the 
holistic sense, merely illusory. In the creation and study of the law, it is 
always necessary to rise somewhat above the current time and space to 
see social fluctuations as only a reflection of a general law of relativity 
which pervades the human world. In this case, it is not a matter of 
emphasizing the conservative nature of the law mentioned earlier, but 
19. For more detail on this, see Bobbio, 1988, pp. 51-61 . 
20. Habennas, 1997, p. 134, is of the opinion that the law presupposes political power, and that 
this power is actually constituted in the fonn of law. 
21. From Kaufman, 1994, p. 29. 
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emphasizing the requirement for the law to have a stabilizing function 
that does not allow the law to succumb to excessive one-sidedness, for 
instance, being excessively programmatic. However, this can only be 
achieved by establishing an appropriate balance between the static and 
dynamic aspects of the law. 
The static aspect of the law is an expression of the illusory idea of an 
objectively definable legal substance. The dynamic aspect is an 
expression of an understanding of the socially and otherwise conditioned 
dynamics of legal development. The illusion of a static aspect is created 
by the rational form of the legal substance in which, under the influence 
of irrational factors (such as intuition, emotions, and will), the 
developmental nature of a rational approach is consciously restricted. 
Translated, this means that while the mind still recognizes different or 
opposing possibilities from those laid down in the legal acts, it 
nevertheless remains "fixed" on the substance contained in the legal acts. 
At the same time, irrational factors can create within the individual a 
psychological feeling that this substance forms a homogenous unit, 
which can only be comprehended in a single correct manner. In this case, 
the mind is of course actually "fixed" only within the legal sphere, 
because on extra-legal levels it can oppose the legal substance through 
various theses, antitheses, etc. On the other hand, we have an idea of the 
rationally dynamic aspect of the law. This is an irrationally conditioned 
expression of "liberated reason," which in its discriminating capacity 
internally divides legal concepts into many different sub-concepts, 
thereby destroying any possibility of comprehending an individual legal 
norm or institution as a substantive unity. In this extreme, we are 
confronted with an infinite dispersion or an infinite pluralism of the legal 
substance, which upon rational reflection enables unlimited diversity in 
the empirical social sphere to which the law relates. 
At the level of legal discourse, these two aspects represent the difference 
between the idea of the scientific nature and the contingency nature of 
the law. These constitute a dualism between the "objective", on the one 
hand, and the "coincidental," the "optional," the "selective," etc., on the 
other. Both aspects are one-sided and as such imperfect since they are 
merely parts of a holistic whole. But because man cannot think in terms 
of unities or wholes, in the law a suitable equilibrium or proportion at 
least has to be ensured and the degree of complementariness between the 
static and dynamic aspects of the law and legal acts optimized.22 It is 
necessary to rationally maintain the idea of an autonomous and objective 
22. Compare Sunstein's findings on the relationship between (constitutional) law and politics 
(Sunstein, 1994, pp. 126-127.) 
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law, and, on the other hand, maintain the idea of pluralism in the content 
of the law, where within the framework of the same legal institute 
various contents are more or less equal in value. This position constitutes 
a sort of equilibrium between the idea of the scientific nature of the law, 
supported mainly by modern formalism and objectivism (conceptualism), 
and the anti-necessitarian approaches to the law, on the other hand, 
which are expressed in the idea of contingency.23 It should be 
remembered in general that the law is a specific combination of the legal 
idea and the sociaUlegal practice, which we can never authentically and 
definitively express in the form of a definition. Kant's proposition that 
lawyers still seek their own notion of the law remains eternally relevant. 
We can summarize all of this in the following manner: to an extent, the 
selection and definition applied in framing a law has a certain 
unchangeable substance, but to a certain degree this abstract or general 
substance is changeable. In the integral irrationaUrational sense, the 
assertion that part of the law is, at least for a certain period of time, 
unchangeable, is fictitious because a concrete definition of the legal 
substance even in this regard is always relative or subjective. This fiction 
is vital for the law as it maintains a certain degree of legal predictability, 
reliability and trust in legal certainty and prevents excessive legal 
relativism or skepticism.24 Although it may seem paradoxical, the fiction 
of the objectiveness of the law needs to be maintained to a certain 
measure. This does not mean that in general, we agree with a pragmatic 
ontology (such as that of Dewey), for on the internal personal level the 
lawyer, as Radbruch said, "must always be aware of the questionable 
nature of his profession." Because each era must write its legal science 
anew,"25 the fiction of a "correct law" is only temporary in nature. 
Nevertheless it is vital because without it every decision made in law and 
also in general would be entirely uncertain and therefore untenable. 
If we summarize these findings in the light of determination, 
interpretation and application of the law, we see that the law is, on one 
hand, determined (static), but on the other hand determinable (dynamic). 
Between these two legal aspects there must exist a general equilibrium 
because excessive dominance of the first aspect would mean that the law 
would be, in the normative sense, completely rigid and socially non-
functional, while excessive use of the second aspect would lead to the 
complete relativization and dissipation of the legal substance and would 
permit and legitimize legal arbitrariness. 
23. For more detail on this, see, for example, Rorty, 1994; Bugaric, 1996. 
24. See, for example, Burton, 1985, p. 188. 
25. Radbruch, 1956, p. 222. 
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V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LAW AND POLITICS 
In general, it can be concluded that law and politics are similar in their 
general normative orientation towards ordering societal relations. 26 
Within this framework, their search for an appropriate or just 
distribution of social statuses and goods depend on the standpoints of the 
given ruling elite at the level of political and legal decision making. Law 
and politics are similar in that both resort to certain ideological 
definitions of their value-related objectives, which are at the highest 
abstract level often even identical. Within the framework of democracy, 
for example, the state based on the rule of law, constitutionality and 
legality, human rights and justice. However, in the process of 
concretization they often grow increasingly different. In concrete cases, 
the law often applies the principle of the state based on the rule of law, 
the principle of justice, or a certain human right differently than politics. 
Besides this, there also exist specific political values, which essentially 
differ from legal values (e.g. the value of affiliation or loyalty to a certain 
political orientation). 
From here onwards, we are already faced with numerous differences 
between the law and politics, of which only the most fundamental will be 
concisely treated in the following sections. With regard to this, in 
perceiving these differences, it is necessary to take into consideration 
that these are by nature relative and based only on the criterion of 
predominance. 27 On the other hand, we must be aware that the law, as 
well as politics, are each by themselves integral units of all their 
components. This is why the definitions of individual differences appear 
from this aspect as only partially reliable or just as illustrative, since the 
elimination of individual components from their integral units 
necessarily modifies their characteristics. It must also be taken into 
consideration that these differences or differentiating criteria can, in 
different cases, appear unconvincing since in certain situations or in its 
individual spheres, politics can assume some characteristics of the law, 
and vice versa. 
Politics institutionally comes into existence within the framework of 
largely political state bodies (e.g. the government and parliament) or 
within the framework of largely politically oriented and functioning 
social groups (e.g., political interest groups). The law comes into 
26. Widespread consensus exists that law, including courts, and politics are important for three 
sets of activities that are central to every modem state: policy-making, social control, and regime 
legitimation (see Jacob, 1996, p. 3). 
27. Cf. Novak, 2003, pp. 55-86. 
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existence on an institutional level within the domain of the above-
mentioned political state bodies, and in the domain of the third branch of 
power, i.e. the judiciary, and in the broader sense in all institutions of the 
judicial system. 
Politics is expressed through political documents and activities (political 
declarations, party programs, activist field work, etc.), as well as through 
legal acts (by adopting the constitution, laws, decrees, codes of rules, 
etc.). The law is most authentically expressed above all in the 
interpretation and application of legal acts by judicial institutions and 
through the theoretical ideas and practical activities of lawyers as a 
special professional class. 
In politics interest and power have a greater role and legitimacy than in 
law. In law, as a general rule, power is replaced with the concept of 
jurisdiction, and interest by the concept of legal evaluation, although 
legal activity at least indirectly reflects certain sociaUpolitical interests 
and in its structure it is imbued also with relations of power. Social and 
political interests are to a large degree implied already in general legal 
acts, in accordance with which courts, for example, adopt decisions. 
Through their legal activities, courts can naturally also implement their 
own interests. In law however, the element of power does not appear as it 
does in politics, where the question of power is connected with the 
aspiration for predominance over other political (and partly also non-
political) ideologies and subjects. In law power appears for example 
through the authority of the higher judicial and other legal bodies which 
by their explanations and decisions de facto or de iure prevail over the 
decisions of the lower judicial and other bodies, and above all also 
through the institutionalized power of the judiciary in comparison with 
other authorities and SUbjects. 
In their psychological-political perception of other subjects, political 
subjects as a general rule establish extremely polarized relationships, 
namely in the categories "ours - theirs," or in the sense "whoever is not 
with us, is against us." In democratic systems, individual political 
subject, like political parties or their individual members, often hide such 
an exclusionary perception from the pUblic. In autocratic or totalitarian 
systems (or in political subjects with totalitarian tendencies) such an 
attitude or perception of differentness is always expressed publicly 
(naturally, only by those holding power). In its extreme form, this aspect 
of political perception is expressed by Schmitt's well-known 
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differentiation between friend and enemy.28 On the other hand, 
polarizations are also characteristic of typical legal procedures that 
appear due to the different views and interests of individual parties in 
legal procedures. However, these polarizations, as a general rule, do not 
have a "higher" interest or direct ideological background. Moreover, 
these polarizations, in comparison with political ones, generally do not 
have the function of fighting for political power. 
In its normative structure and actual functioning, politics is more 
adaptable and flexible than law. A political decision or political 
agreement can be, content wise, much more diverse and nuanced than is 
generally true for decisions or agreements in legal forms (e.g. judgments 
or contracts). At the same time, politics has a much broader field of 
functioning at its disposal. In comparison with the law, politics is not 
confined by the framework of the set legal norms, but can, to a greater 
degree than law and in a more diverse manner, spread to other value-
normative spheres (e.g., the field of religion, morals, the economy, 
customs, etc.). Accordingly, politics is also more flexible in seeking 
compromises between different ideological, interest, or normative 
premises. The law is also in this respect more rigid and can implement 
compromise only where the legal system dictates or allows, for example, 
a "compromise" between aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
criminal cases, or a compromise between the principle of legal equality 
and the social state with regard to their connected explanation and use. 
By its nature and practical functioning, politics is considerably less 
predictable and reliable than law. With a little irony, we can seek and 
find the confirmation of this in many political promises and predictions. 
Conversely, legal actions are fairly precisely determined by published 
legal acts, which can be changed only in accordance with previously 
envisaged and, as a general rule, public procedures. In contrast, political 
activity, especially in its part that legitimately extends beyond the sphere 
of law, is determined more loosely and is not subject to reliable time-
based conditions and limitations. Furthermore, the share of political 
28. As is well known, Carl Schmitt is of the opinion that the distinction between friend and 
enemy is, in the last resort, a specific criterion (differentia specifica) of the political sphere, as 
opposed to the dichotomies "good - evil", "beautiful - ugly", "beneficial- harmful", etc., which can 
be found in morals, aesthetics, and economics. According to this author, the distinction between 
friend and enemy explains political actions and motives, with regard to which this distinction is 
sensible only if it refers to an extreme level of intensity of the association or dissociation (see 
Schmitt, 1994, pp. 84-85). At this point we can mention, for example, that according to Freund the 
relation between friend and enemy is one of the three presuppositions of the essence of the political. 
The other two are the relationship between command and subordination and the relationship 
between the private and the public (see Freund, 1997, pp. 100-103). 
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guidelines actually determined and political norms are determined by 
political actors and are not entirely transparently accessible to the public. 
Politics and the law differ to a considerable degree regarding sanctions, 
although they partly also overlap in this field. On one hand, the law itself 
prescribes certain sanctions for politically unsuccessful actions, like a 
change of government as a consequence of a constructive vote of no 
confidence in the government. On the other hand, legal and political 
incorrectness can be simultaneously penalized in a legal manner, like 
imprisonment in the event of abusing a position of authority. Naturally, 
there exist specific political sanctions that the law is not familiar with, 
for example, spontaneous or organized criticism, the demand for 
someone's resignation, or not electing someone. Sanctions also exists 
that cannot be directly connected with political mistakes (e.g., a fine for a 
traffic violation). In law, it is only possible to pronounce a sanction in 
accordance with a legal procedure carried out prior to that, while in 
politics a sanction can also be imposed without such a procedure (e.g. 
criticism or a boycott). 
At this point, the difference between the law and politics stemming from 
their different perception of the relationship between rights and duties 
must be mentioned. Since both belong to the field of defining rights and 
duties, law and politics can be similar in this respect. However, the 
correlational imperative - attributive consciousness is primarily the 
domain of legal thinking and functioning, since only the law very clearly 
and consistently strives for the establishment of a proportionate 
correlation between rights and duties. At the starting level of the 
comparison between law and politics, it can be seen that political actors 
strive for an unlimited right to implement their own political ideology. 
The law in a democratic political system determines those limits that a 
particular political ideology is not allowed to exceed, since by doing such 
it would excessively or inadmissibly limit the space for the 
implementation of other admissible political ideologies, or it would 
inadmissibly interfere with the basic rights of individuals, or impede the 
fundamental constitutional values of society. On other levels of political 
functioning, political actors strive in their consciousness and actions for 
the maximum utilization of functioning space allowed by the legally 
defined rights and freedoms. In this respect, the law is considerably more 
balanced since it, corre1ationally and proportionally places equal weight 
and importance on rights and duties. In addition the law protects the 
fundamental human rights of individuals in relation to political 
authorities. 
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This presentation certainly does not encompass all possible differences 
between the law and politics. It is clear that these differences can also be 
relativized (or absolutized) in many respects. Nevertheless, such a 
presentation can be beneficial from many aspects because it calls 
attention to the fact that the law and politics are different due to their 
different value-related starting points. 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS 
All of the presented arguments regarding the autonomy of the law, as 
well as regarding the similarities and differences between the law and 
politics, which were intended primarily for the sphere of the national law 
and politics, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the sphere of international 
law and politics. Naturally, there are some significant differences 
between both spheres, but most of these differences are, regarding the 
issue of the autonomy of international law, only a matter of degree or 
intensity. 
Over the years, international law and its relationship to national laws 
have been defined in a variety of ways. It is crucial that international law 
be comprehended as law, and is relatively autonomous with regard to 
national legal orders, and also regarding national and international 
politics. Of course, there have always been different and opposing 
theories concerning this issue. There are several arguments for and 
against the claim that international law is truly law.29 Here again, we are 
faced with the issue of ontological monism or dualism. If we are inclined 
toward monism, we tend to define international and national law as a 
unity, while a dualistic approach leads us toward the establishment of 
essential differences between both entities. 
Although there have been many thinkers and scholars who have 
defended either the monistic or dualistic approach,30 it seems that today 
the dualistic understanding prevails in theory and practice. International 
law can be defined as a relatively independent set or system of legal 
rules (legal norms), called and comprehended as law, and applies to 
normatively determined legal subjects, primarily to states and 
international organizations, but also to other subjects, such as "peoples", 
and individual human beings.31 International law significantly differs 
from national legal systems due to its predominantly horizontal nature, 
29. See, for example, Arend, 1996, pp. 292-293. 
30. See Andrassy, 1984, pp. 4-6. 
31. Cf. Arend 1999, pp. 26-35. 
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its embodiment in the system of international relations, the nature of its 
sources, the nature of its subjects and their treatment within the sphere of 
international law, the lack of a central ("sovereign") legal authority, the 
decentralization of legal functions, the characteristics of legal procedures 
before international tribunals, and, last but not least, the weak and 
specific nature of international legal obligations and sanctions.32 Hence, it 
is useless from a practical point of view to maintain a theoretical 
approach that denies any essential difference between international and 
national law. 
There are, of course, some common features which can be ascribed to 
any system of law, such as a set of legal norms (legal principles and 
rules), the existence of certain legal procedures, and a person or body 
that creates legal norms and adjudicates accordingly, the existence of 
relatively effective legal sanctions, etc. Yet, at the very core of its 
existence the law is a collective psychological phenomenon, which 
manifests itself in humans' collective imperative-attributive normative 
comprehensions of the conflicting relationships between different legal 
subjects.33 As explained above, every greater digression from this 
relatively balanced imperative-attributive normative comprehension of 
social relations means that in our minds we have left the legal dimension 
and entered some other.34 Thus, to put it simply, international law exists 
as a relatively autonomous phenomenon in relation to national law, as 
well as to international or states' politics, only inasmuch as we 
comprehend it as law and treat it as such at the level of international and 
other relations. 
Almost all factors that establish the relative autonomy of the law apply 
more or less to the autonomy of international law. These factors are 
individually and together much weaker than in the case of national law. 
It is a well-known fact that in international relations politics have a much 
stronger impact on international law than within individual democratic 
states, where modem law, governed by the rule of law, applies. For this 
reason it is important that all legal and political actors at the international 
level strive for more autonomy of international law, especially in relation 
to politics. As long as checks and balances between international law and 
politics do not reach a more satisfactory, i.e. equilibrated level, the 
32. See, for example, Cassese, 2005, pp. 3-21; Shaw, 2007, pp. 1-13. 
33. This kind of psychological view of the law was developed by Leonid Petrazicki - see 
Podgorac, 1981, pp. 64-79. 
34. Thus, for example, if we want to extend our rights without limits in order to gain more 
social power and to realize some particular interests, we are in the dimension of political thinking, 
while our exclusive focus on our inner duties, guided by our conscience, means that we have entered 
the dimension of (our) morality. 
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demand for greater legal autonomy should remain the leading thought of 
all international actors. 
The same reasons that lead to the recognition of the differences between 
law and politics at the national level, must also be recognized in the 
sphere of the comparison between international law and politics of any 
kind. As already mentioned, these differences, when applied to the field 
of international relations, appear to be more a matter of degree than 
content. Thus, the relationship between international law and politics 
differs from the relationship between democratic state law and politics 
mainly in the following ways: a) in comparison with national law, 
international law is more intensively mixed with politics in the activities 
of international lawyers and specialized legal institutions, such as 
international courts and tribunals; b) international law is more strongly 
influenced and manipulated by political power and interests; c) it is more 
subject to political thinking in terms of "ours" and "theirs", or "friends" 
and "enemies"; d) it is more flexible, and, with some exemptions (such 
as the practices of international courts) also less predictable than national 
law; e) it is, as a rule, weaker than national law in the sphere of 
implementing legal obligations or sanctions; f) the correlational 
imperative-attributive attitude of its bearers, especially international 
political and legal actors, is weaker than in national law, because of the 
stronger impact of politics. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
From the point of view of the law, it can be concluded that national law, 
as well international law, function in relation towards politics in three 
basic aspects, namely, as a goal, means, or obstacle. First, politics (in the 
meaning of political mind or political actors) can define certain 
predominantly legal values or institutions (such as, for example, the 
principle of legal equality, the presumption of innocence, or the right to 
privacy) as its goal. In this case the political understanding of these 
values or institutions becomes almost identical to an authentic legal 
understanding of the same values or institutions (e.g., politics strives for 
the protection of the principle of legal equality or the right to privacy). 
Second, politics can comprehend the law merely as a means for the 
fulfillment of certain political interests. In this case politics is neutral in 
its attitude toward the law (e.g. politics defines and realizes its political 
interests and goals in accordance with the principle of legality and legal 
equality). Third, politics can understand law as an obstacle on the way 
toward the realization of certain political goals. In this case there are two 
basic solutions: either politics prevails over the law, or vice versa. In the 
first case politics effectuates its solutions at the expense of the rule of 
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law (for example, the legislature enacts laws which give the executive 
branch more discretionary powers; or politics leaves the laws unchanged, 
but it does not act in accordance with them), while in the second case the 
autonomy of (international) law is preserved by the decisions of the 
highest (international or national) courts, or by other actions taken by 
lawyers, intellectuals, different associations, and organizations, and, last 
but not least, the wider public in order to stop illicit acts of political 
actors. 
The law and politics create their own particular pictures of reality. None 
of these pictures correspond to reality as such, which is an inseparable 
unity beyond our human comprehension. However, both particular 
pictures are of utmost importance for our societal life. Sometimes they 
overlap, and sometimes they differ, more or less strongly. Yet, there is 
something that the law, either national or international, should never 
include in its sphere. Namely, the differentiation of adversaries according 
to a genuinely political criteria, which leads to a strict separation between 
"ours" and "yours", or, in its most radical expression, to a strict 
separation between friend and enemy. The ideal of Justice, often 
presented in a statue of a woman with blindfolded eyes and scales in her 
hand, must always remain the fundamental guiding principle of the law, 
and especially of judges and other lawyers, who must never allow 
themselves to comprehend the parties in conflict - either individuals, or 
different legal entities, including states and international organizations -
as enemies. When the latter occurs, politics inevitably prevails over the 
law, and the judge or any other person who thinks and feels in that 
political-ideological way causes, in proportion to their social rank and 
power (influence), serious damage to the autonomy of the rule of law. 
This is, in turn, destructive for the democratic society and international 
relations and must be as such avoided or appropriately confronted to the 
highest possible degree. 
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